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Introduction 
The issue of abandoning fiscal decision-making authority by central government in 
favor of local and regional-level governance bodies has become a global process 
extending to most countries across the world. Over last decades, fiscal 
decentralization has been assessed as a mechanism for constraining the 
expansionary tendencies of political powers. According to distinguished scholars 
Buchanan and Musgrave (1999), who have contributed to decentralization theory, 
although, historically, the distribution of government authority between central and 
local governments has been an ineffective system; decentralization is an important 
process in terms of ensuring controls over the central government and increasing 
people’s opportunities for participation in local decision-making authority 
(Svyaneich, 2003). Albeit public discussions regarding which of these-centralized 
or decentralized state government proceed, in both political and economic terms, 
most advanced countries choose to practice the second one. Due to either the 
failures in economic planning by central governments or rapidly changing 
international economic and political conjecture, the emergence of decentralization 
is seemed as a contemporary trend among developing and transition economies. 
Traditionally, the theoretical and empirical analysis of fiscal decentralization has 
given little attention to the objective of economic growth. During the period 
following World War II, and in particular the 1960s and 1970s, many nations -both 
developed and developing- embarked upon a strong centralization of government 
policy and functions.  
The basic economic case for fiscal decentralization is the enhancement of 
economic efficiency: the provision of local outputs that are differentiated according 
to local tastes and circumstances results in higher levels of social welfare than 
centrally determined and more uniform levels of outputs across all jurisdictions. 
Fiscal decentralization is commonly thought to restrict the growth of government 
spending. Just as tax competition in an era of globalization is believed to place 
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constraints on the revenue-raising capacity of governments, inter-jurisdictional 
competition within decentralized countries is believed to hamper government’s 
ability to tax. 
On the other side, the effect of decentralization on economic growth is another 
controversial issue that has been widely discussed in both theoretical and empirical 
terms. Neither the theoretical arguments for the positive impact of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth due to the presence of economic efficiency 
gains, nor the scarce empirical evidence for it are conclusive. The empirical 
approaches can be also differed in several aspects: the selection of different 
economies, the time period chosen, the economies’ level of development and the 
estimation methodology. There are few empirical studies that analyze the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, and 
unfortunately the evidence on this topic is inconclusive. 
 
Theoretical background  
While looking through a vast range of economical literature, diverse approaches 
has been confronted toward fiscal decentralization and its influence on improving 
economic efficiency, managing public financial policy and social policy. 
Summarizing, these opinions, fiscal decentralization can be assessed as the 
devolution by the central government to local governments (states, regions, 
municipalities) of specific functions with the administrative authority and fiscal 
revenue to perform those functions (Kee, 2003). It can also be explained as the 
division of public expenditure and revenue between levels of government, and the 
discretion given to regional and local government to determine their budgets by 
levying taxes and fees and allocating resources (Davey, 2003). The European 
Charter of Local Self-Government also defines the framework for fiscal 
decentralization. According to Article 9 of the carter local authorities shall be 
entitled, within national economic policy, to adequate financial resources of their 
own, of which they may dispose freely within framework of their powers. 
The theoretical base of fiscal decentralization dates from 17
th
 and 18
th
 century 
philosophers, including Rousseau, Mill, de Tocqueville, Montesquieu and Madison 
because of distrusting central governments’ ability to preserve the liberties of free 
men and maintain its ruling function (Faguet, 1997).The modern case for 
decentralized government was articulated by Wolman Bennet (1990) who 
appreciated necessity for decentralization using two parameters: (1) efficiency 
values- “maximization” of social welfare taking into account inability of the public 
sector to contain the same price signals as the private sector, to regulate supply and 
 Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: A dilemma between theory and… 79 
demand; (2) governance values including responsiveness and accountability, 
diversity, and political participation. 
Two interrelated issues should be mentioned while investigating fiscal 
decentralization. The first is the division of spending responsibilities and revenue 
sources between levels of government (national, regional, local). The second is the 
amount of discretion given to regional and local governments to determine their 
expenditures and revenues. Davey suggests that dimension of power and 
responsibility between central and local governments substantially depends on 
these factors: 
 what range of public services they finance; 
 whether their revenues are commensurate with these responsibilities; 
 how much real choice they have in allocating their budget to individual 
services; 
 whether they can determine the rates of their taxes and charges  
Fiscal decentralization also referred to as fiscal federalism can be broadly defined 
as the study of the structure and functioning of multi-tiered governments. 
According to Oates’s (2005) dividing, researches relating to this issue can be sorted 
into two strands: 
 The first-generation theory which including contributions of Samuelson 
(1954), who defined the nature of public goods, Arrow (1970), who conceptualized 
the roles of the private and public sectors, and Musgrave (1959), who proposed the 
functions of the government (income distribution, market failure correction, and 
macroeconomic stabilization). Based on these investigations, it would be best for 
the central government to take a lead in macroeconomic stabilization policy, 
income redistribution, and provision of national public goods. Local governments 
would be best positioned to provide local public goods because of their superior 
knowledge of local preferences. On the other hand, central government should 
monitor and balance the provision of local public goods aiming to prevent negative 
spillovers which can affect other local governments. The issue of taxation in 
multilayered government is one of the main problems known as the “tax 
assignment problem” which a number of researches were addressed to. This 
generation suggests that local governments ought to focus on property taxes and 
user fees. It also claims that because of highly mobility of taxes bases which would 
lead to relocation of people to the areas with relatively low tax rates, execution of 
other sort of taxes by local authorities can create distortions in the location and 
levels of economic activity. 
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 The second generation encompasses a range of contributions to the theory 
of federalism focus on information problems, moral hazard, and free riding among 
the various levels of governments. Some scholars like Weingast (1995) and 
McKinnon (1997) especially accentuate the reliance on local government’s own 
sources of revenues for the finance of decentralized budgets. They also distinguish 
between hard versus soft budget constraints where soft budget constraints are 
ignored by the local governments on the belief that a bailout by the central 
government is possible. This became known as the problem of “raiding the fiscal 
commons.” Rodden (2003) expanded these ideas by suggesting that it is not 
decentralization that matters per se but what form it takes. Summarizing his 
opinion, decentralization process with local governments relying on their own 
resources should be more efficient than a decentralization based on transfers which 
could also lead to perverse forms of decentralization. 
The fiscal federalism theory has focused on the perspective of efficiency and the 
distributive consequences of a fiscal decentralization. Although the traditional 
argument for fiscal decentralization is that it may provide greater economic 
efficiency in the allocation of resources in the public sector (Oates, 1972),the 
relationship in direct and indirect form between efficiency and economic growth 
has been analyzed to a very limited extent. The theory maintains in case of having 
various preferences for public goods between jurisdictions, an attempt to provide 
unique provision of them by central government cannot achieve the same level of 
efficiency as a decentralized provision. It also offers that supplying the best 
combination of public services and local tax rate is possible only when there are 
incentives and mobility for individuals to move to the jurisdiction. Therefore, 
decentralizing revenue rising and spending decisions are appreciated as a 
significant method to improve the public sector efficiency, reduce budget deficit 
and promote economic growth by a number of scholars including Bird (1993) and 
Gramlich (1993). 
The experience indicate us that meeting all of the competing needs of local 
authorities is gradually impeding central governments to sustain their other 
constitutional activity which in turn make them attempt to build local capacity by 
delegating responsibilities downward to their regional governments with the 
purpose to assist them on national economic development strategies. Moreover, 
regional and local political leaders demand more autonomy and want the taxation 
powers that go along with their expenditure responsibility. At this point, it ought to 
mention that most authors assume that the subnational- local or regional 
governments are in a better position than the central government knowing the 
potential factors of growth, that is, their territory needs in infrastructures, education 
or innovation and research. Thus, if they have expenditure autonomy, they can 
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design a strategy of growth more adapted to the reality of their territory. Financing 
expenditure autonomy of these local authorities can be in several forms like (1) 
intergovernmental transfers- (a)shares of national taxes distributed either by 
formula or by origin; (b)grants/subventions which are either targeted to support 
specific expenditures or untargeted and used at the discretion of local government 
(often known as block grants) or (2) capital expenditures basically financed from 
i)grants from the State Budget or national funds; ii)operating surplus; iii)sale of 
assets; iv)credit (loans or bonds). 
Nevertheless, if there are economies of scale in the production of the public good 
decentralized provision may be more inefficient than when it is centralized. 
(Rothenberg 1970) Some researchers claim that existing spillover effects, 
corruption and externalities between authorities indeed lead to economically 
inefficiency losses in massive amounts. The rationale for decentralization of 
revenues is not the same as expenditures and fiscal decentralization may limit the 
ability of the principal (the central government) to influence policy at the local 
level. Elsewhere, Brennan and Buchanan (1980) argued that taking into 
consideration sub-national governments’ incentives to maximize their budget fiscal 
decentralization may contribute to containing the size of their budgets and thus 
restraining the overall size of the public sector in case of these authorities compete 
in objectives other than revenue maximization, such as keeping tax rates stable or 
even lowering them, and the efficient production of public goods under certain 
revenue constraints. Another argument against decentralization is relating to 
economic efficiency which suggests that it requires roughly even regional fiscal 
capacities—a condition not existing in developing countries. Based on these 
arguments, decentralization may even increase fiscal inequities in developing 
countries. In addition, localities might engage in destructive competition to attract 
industry. Tanzi (1996) summarizes this critique by raising a number of situations or 
conditions, especially in developing countries, where fiscal decentralization may 
lead to less than an optimal result: 
 Taxpayers may have insufficient information or no political power to 
pressure local policymakers to make resource-efficient decisions. 
 Local politicians may be more corrupt than national politicians or at least 
find themselves in more corrupting situations. 
 The quality of national bureaucracies is likely to be better than local 
bureaucracies. 
 Technological chance and increased mobility may reduce the number of 
services that are truly “local” in nature. 
 Local governments often lack good public expenditure management systems 
to assist them in their tax and budget choices. 
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 Fiscal decentralization may exacerbate a central government’s ability to deal 
with structural fiscal imbalances. 
Finally, there may be some inefficiency due to corruption in the assignment of 
some services. These losses can generate lower growth, because they can be greater 
than the possible gains of producer efficiency that could be produced in a context 
of fiscal decentralization. 
 
Relation between decentralization and economic growth 
There is no clear cut dealing with the effect of decentralization of economic 
growth. Not only the theoretical arguments but also empirical studies analyzing the 
relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic growth are not 
conclusive. Aiming to quantify the impact of decentralization on the achievement 
of higher levels of economic growth, a variety of studies were conducted which 
took into account multiple definitions of decentralization as well national-regional 
level estimations. While most of the theories on fiscal decentralization argue for a 
positive association between both variables, the empirical evidence is inconclusive, 
with an increasing number of studies showing a negative correlation between 
decentralization and economic performance. The majority of the empirical studies 
highlighting a positive association between both factors concern developed 
countries. Many studies indicate that the success of decentralization processes is a 
consequence of not only the design of the decentralization model but, perhaps more 
importantly, of country characteristics, and especially of the existence of strong 
effective institutions at all government tiers. (Dabla-Norris, 2006) Empirical results 
vary among state-regional level and the consideration of developed and non-
developed countries. All these studies use different definitions of decentralization 
measures and economic control variables in the specification of the growth 
equation. Most of these studies start up from a neoclassical growth model, while 
some have used partial considerations derived from endogenous growth models. 
The neoclassical approach identifies which would be the factors to consider under a 
Cobb-Douglas production function or the best ones for estimation in a β-
convergence framework. However because of some scholars’ criticisms of the 
robustness of the estimations of the chosen neoclassical model and also the 
suggestion that the mean average would not be representative for the economies 
considered as a whole on the other, create doubts relating to the appropriateness of 
habitual estimations to the real relation between decentralization and economic 
growth.  
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Studies originally centered around the arguments in favor of fiscal decentralization 
suggest that it leads higher efficiency, better public service, greater transparency 
and, eventually, economic growth. It is considered that because of local 
governments’ better positioning than central ones to deliver public services as a 
result of proximity and informational advantage, decentralization increase 
efficiency. (Klugman, 1994) This approach is especially significant factor for the 
low-developed and emerging countries where lack of markets opportunities and 
functionality make people rely on actions by governments. Moreover, taking into 
consideration population mobility and competition among local governments in the 
delivering of public services, the idea that local governments are better equipped to 
provide a more adequate service to the local population than central governments 
comes again to the fore. Decentralization may thus improve not only the potential 
for achieving Pareto efficiency, but also for achieving greater economic equality 
across territories. Subnational governments are often bound by balanced budget 
requirements, which fuel procyclicality, as local expenditure and revenue move 
together. Making transfers to local governments more contingent on the cycle 
would help mitigate the adverse impact of fiscal decentralization on 
macroeconomic stabilization. The legal fiscal framework could include such a 
provision, to be triggered when the severity (IMF, 2015). Thiessen (2003) 
considers that decentralized expenditures may lead to greater “consumer 
efficiency”. In addition, because of difference in the amount of demands in each 
territory, resources can be saved by diversifying governments’ outputs in 
accordance with local demands (Martínez- Vazquez and McNab, 2003). Another 
aspect related with fiscal decentralization concerns the incentive to innovate in the 
production and supply of public goods in order to reduce production costs and, 
hence, increase public sector productivity. This is an important argument that 
favors decentralization (Feld et al., 2004) and economic growth. It is due to the fact 
that the experimentation and innovation in the provision of local or regional public 
goods and services may generate greater producer efficiency. Hence, subnational 
governments can produce more output (or better quality output) than the central 
government, with the same level of expenditures. Eventually, the higher quantity or 
quality of the locally provided public services could generate a higher income 
increase, and this is a measure of growth. More recently, some works dealing with 
connections between decentralization and growth are centered on the possibility of 
preserving and promotion of the development of markets. It is believed that 
appropriately structured intergovernmental fiscal arrangements may create 
sufficient incentives for subnational governments to foster markets. Moreover, if 
the central government is a source of policy inefficiency, decentralization may 
improve resource allocation, foster market development, and, in turn, promote 
economic growth. 
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Based on analysis of long years and experience from different countries, key 
advantages of fiscal decentralization provision can be listed as below: 
 Fiscal decentralization is one of the core conditions in ensuring the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity in empirical studies- holding tasks and 
responsibilities are transferred to the lowest possible level of government which is 
the closest to the people; 
 Fiscal decentralization boosts transparency in the public money spending 
–unlike central and other governmental units, it is easier and more durable to share 
public scrutiny mechanisms for fiscal resources used by local governments; 
 Fiscal decentralization increases allocative efficiency in terms of 
managing public means – an efficiency in which limited resources are allocated for 
those types of goods and services that are more desirable in t society and also in 
high demand. (Zimmermann, 2003) 
Some studies even consider it harmful, especially in the case of developing and 
transition economies. This skepticism is fuelled by problems often associated with 
decentralization, such as increasing deficits, lower quality of government decisions, 
corruption, increased influence of interest groups and greater interregional 
inequalities, which may result in lower overall economic growth. It is often the 
case that carefree subnational governments have built up unsustainable deficits and 
called upon central governments to assume their liabilities and in some cases 
provide special bailout transfers. Recent studies have tended to find that increasing 
subnational deficits lead to higher central government expenditures and debt along 
with higher inflation rates. This is especially a concern in the case of the fast 
implementation of decentralization in parts of Central and Eastern Europe. It is also 
difficult for governments to implement macroeconomic stabilization in 
decentralized frameworks, because of the considerable economic ‘leakage’ 
associated with local expenditures According to Thiessen (2003), the variance of 
incomes between households and regions which produce inequities under fiscal 
decentralization, the lack of sub-national governments’ incentives to act counter-
cyclically, the quality of governments and of local democracy, low per capita 
income levels, a country’s small size, the scarcity of good local taxes, the low 
degree of urbanization and the lack of goods and services that qualify as public are 
the ones affect the quality of fiscal decentralization.  
Existing of vulnerability of democracy and political accountability in developing 
and transition economies, the delivery of resources and public services constitute 
the greater risk group of corruption and opportunistic behavior at lower levels of 
government. In this case, fiscal decentralization carries higher possibility of 
reinforcing regional inequalities to the detriment of overall economic growth. 
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Decentralization can make it less likely that certain regions benefit from sharing of 
best practices and economies of scale and as in many less developed regions the 
level of training of staff in local government is lower than elsewhere, even 
managing basic tasks such as accounting and record-keeping can become 
problematic (Odero, 2004). 
Based on these empirical facts, fiscal decentralization is assessed fundamentally 
suitable for developed countries with relatively high levels of per capita income 
which prevent taxpayers from the problems that associated with lower income 
countries by some researchers. Experiences of various countries show us that in 
spite of the fact that naturally decentralization has been shaped in large measure by 
political, historical, and ethnic realities, its effectiveness and successful 
implementation is influenced by the comprehensive institutional design and 
capacities at all tiers of government. 
On the other side, while analyzing studies pointing to fiscal decentralization’s 
positive effect on growth, measured from either the revenue or expenditure point of 
view. However, there are also some works as Davoodi and Zou (1998) who 
analyzed a panel data set of forty-six developed and developing countries using a 
specification based on the Barro model and reported a negative relationship for 
both the whole panel data set and the panel data set of developing countries; or 
Woller and Phillips (1998) for twenty-three less developed countries, by Zhang and 
Zou (2001) for the Chinese provinces, and by Xie, Zou and Davoodi (1999) for the 
US. (Espasa et al., 2007) 
 
Measurement and empirical controversies 
The main reasons contributing such appearing differences drastically among 
empirical researches can be explained with these relevant factors: (1) the economic 
development level and (2) the fiscal decentralization threshold that has been 
exceeded in each central regional decentralization process. Additionally, choosing 
the indicator with the purpose to use in measuring the fiscal decentralization is also 
controversial issue which is become serious while conducting empirical analysis on 
the consequences of fiscal decentralization or finding a more appropriate measure 
of the prevailing degree of decentralization in a chosen country. Summarizing the 
most quantitative measures used in theoretical researches to define degree of 
decentralization, these ones can be highlighted: 
 Decentralization of expenditure responsibilities- reflects the level of 
autonomy powers and responsibilities of sub-national governments; 
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 Tax decentralization – entails the scope of autonomy responsibilities of local 
governments in shaping local revenues; 
 Level of independence of local fiscal system – the level of government 
participation, efficiency, flexibility and transparency of transfer system in 
shaping intergovernmental transfer system, the level of ratio of transfers to 
subnational and provincial budgets to transfers from revenue resources; 
 Drawing right decentralization – reflects the level of opportunity to make 
independent decisions by local governments. (Agayev, 2013) 
Generalized coefficient called “Fiscal Decentralization Index” is used broadly to 
prevent from inadequateness stemming from various methodologies of assessment. 
Conceptually, FDI can be divided into two broad categories: (i) the fiscal 
autonomy of subnational governments- the ratio “local revenue to total local 
expenditures” without taking into consideration central government transfers; (ii) 
the fiscal importance of subnational governments- the ratio of local government 
expenditures to total government expenditures minus central government transfers 
to local government. A Decentralization Index (FDI) range from zero to 100 in 
which 0‹FDI‹50 describes “relative fiscal centralization” while 50‹FDI‹100 
illustrates as “relative fiscal decentralization”. 
On the other hand, most studies assume a budgetary perspective and use measures 
constructed by taking the ratio of sub-federal revenues and/or spending to total 
government revenue and/or spending. Especially in cross-country studies, such 
measures are usually constructed on the basis of the IMF’s Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS) dataset. One well recognized drawback of the GFS measures is 
that they provide an inaccurate picture of the “true” level of decentralization. As 
Rodden (2004) notes, GFS uses the revenue obtained by sub-federal governments 
at face value while taking the expenditures undertaken and ignoring these 
resources’ mandating by central government regulations. Therefore, there is a great 
probability that GFS measures might incorrectly offer a high degree of 
decentralization, in spite of the fact that autonomy of sub-federal governments over 
fiscal matters might actually be negligible. Moreover, because of massive transfers 
from consolidated tax revenues to local authorities, the GFS can indicate high level 
of revenue decentralization, albeit local governments’ power on deciding tax rates 
and bases is substantially restricted. That is, a large value of the GFS measures for 
revenue decentralization might not necessarily imply a large amount of de fact 
autonomy.  
There are several attempts with the purposes to compensate deficiencies of the GFS 
decentralization measure. Thornton (2007) used a measure which originally 
provided by OECD and involved differentiating sub-federal tax revenue according 
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to the level of autonomy sub-federal governments have over the associated rates 
and bases, and then calculating the ratios with regard to total government tax 
receipts. Even though the data used by Thornton provide a better approximation of 
the true extent of decentralization than the GFS measures there are two drawbacks. 
Firstly, they are only available as a cross-section dataset and, secondly, for 19 
countries only. The results obtained in this measure imply no robust relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth and might be distorted due to 
unobserved heterogeneity and/or small-sample biases. Rauscher develops an 
endogenous growth model with Leviathan governments in which fiscal competition 
due to decentralization leads to a reduced frequency of political innovation and 
lower economic growth (Feld and Baskaran, 2009). 
In the light of the given the measurement problems, it is not surprising that the 
researches on the impact of fiscal decentralization on economic growth by diverse 
authors end up with controversial results. In the Table 1, various cross-countries 
researches illustrate that difference in development levels of studied countries and 
using methodologies in these studies contribute controversial results. 
 
Table 1. Empirical studies on the influence of fiscal decentralization or federalism on 
economic growth in cross-country studies
1
 
Study Countries Period Method Main results 
 
Davoodi and 
Zou (1998)  
 
46 Developing 
and Developed 
Countries  
 
1970-1989  
five and ten 
year averages  
Fixed 
Effects 
Model, Time 
Dummies, 
Unbalanced 
Panel  
 
10% higher 
decentralization of 
spending reduces growth 
of real GDP per capita in 
developing countries by 
0.7-0.8%-points (10% 
significance level)  
Woller and 
Philipps 
(1998)  
 
23 Developing 
Countries  
 
1974-1991  
three and five 
year averages 
and annual 
data 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model, OLS  
 
No robust significant 
effect of the decen-
tralization of spending or 
revenue on growth of 
real GDP per capita  
Yilmaz (2000)  
 
17 Unitary 
States,  
1971-1990  
annual data  
Fixed 
Effects 
Decentralization of 
expenditures at the local 
                                                          
1
This table is originally taken from the paper called “Fiscal Federalism, Decentralization and 
Economic Growth: A Meta-Analysis” by Lars P. Feld, Thushyanthan Baskaran, Jan Schnellenbach 
based on their own compilation. 
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13 Federal 
Countries, 
Newly 
Industrialized 
Countries and  
Developed 
Countries  
Models, 
Time 
Dummies, 
GLS  
 
level increases growth of 
real GDP per capita in 
unitary states more than 
in federal countries. 
Decentralization at the 
regional level is not 
significant  
Ebel and 
Yilmaz (2002)  
 
6 Transition 
Countries  
 
1997-1999  
 
Bivariate 
OLS 
 
Decentralization is in 
general positively related 
to economic growth  
Eller  
(2004)  
22 OECD 
Countries  
 
1972-1996, 
annual and 
four year 
averages  
 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Time Dum-
mies 
 
Decentralization is 
positively related to 
economic growth  
Enikolopov 
and 
Zhuravskaya 
(2003)  
 
21 Developed 
and 70 
Developing and 
Transition 
Countries  
 
Cross-section 
of the 
averages 
1975-2000  
 
OLS, 2SLS  
 
10% higher 
decentralization of 
revenue reduces growth 
of real GDP per capita in 
developing countries by 
0.14%-points (5% 
significance level)  
Thiessen 
(2003)  
 
21 Developed 
Countries  
 
 
Cross-section 
of the 
averages of 
1973-1998 
OLS 
Decentralization of 
spending by 10% 
increases growth of real 
GDP per capita by 
0.15%-points (5% 
significance level), 
quadratic term is 
significantly negative  
Thiessen 
(2003a  
 
26 Developed 
Coun-tries  
 
Panel data 
1981-1995  
 
GLS  
 
Decentralization of 
spending by 10% 
increases growth of real 
GDP per capita by 
0.12%-points (5% 
significance level).  
Iimi (2005)  
 
51 Developing 
and Developed 
Countries  
 
Cross-section 
of the average 
of 1997 to 
2001  
OLS, IV  
 
10% higher 
decentralization of 
spending increases 
growth of real GDP per 
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 capita by 0.6%-points 
(1% significance level)  
Feld, 
Baskaran and 
Dede (2004) 
19 OECD 
countries 
Panel data 
1973-1998  
 
Fixed 
Effects, 
Time Dum-
mies 
 
No robust effect of 
spending or revenue 
decentralization, but a 
significantly negative 
effect of stronger 
participation in revenue 
sharing arrangements  
Bodman and 
Ford (2006) 
18 OECD 
Countries 
Cross-section 
of 1996 and 
Panel data 
1981-1998  
 
OLS No significant effect of 
revenue or spending 
decentralization on 
economic growth  
 
The main reason for empirical controversies can be considered choosing an 
appropriate econometric framework to indicate relationship between 
decentralization and economic growth. Another problem is dealing with using the 
plain coefficients is that different studies apply different measures of 
decentralization and economic growth. The estimated coefficients are not 
dimensionless and therefore not directly comparable across studies without some 
standardization according to the precision of the study. Empirical studies do also 
not provide strong support for an impact of federalism, decentralization or fiscal 
competition on economic growth. Overall, the empirical evidence is rather 
inconclusive whether there is an effect at all and they also suffer from the fact that 
often the autonomy of sub-federal jurisdictions is not properly measured.  
 
Conclusion 
According to the theory of fiscal federalism, fiscal competition leads to efficient 
allocative outcomes which might eventually promote higher rates of economic 
growth. As accentuated above, some researchers give specific attention to a 
positive correlation between increasing efficiency in the state sector through fiscal 
decentralization and reducing disproportions between regions. On the other hand, it 
is sometimes considered that sustainable economic growth can be provided only by 
central government, while expansion of the public sector at the subnational level 
can boost irresponsible debt policy. Experiences indicate us that although 
economic growth is achieved when all public services and powers are delivered by 
central government, the quality of service provision is low and the role of 
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institutions in civil society development are weakened. Therefore, it is often argued 
that decentralization is important and it is impossible to secure effective 
governance without redistributing main authority responsibility and financial 
resources among local government tiers. 
With respect to the theoretical studies, possible influence channels of fiscal 
decentralization on economic growth can be as below: 
 Tiebout channel- an advantage of decentralized provision and financing of 
public goods, namely tailoring them to heterogeneous preferences of individuals, 
shows up in economic growth as resulting different savings rates might affect the 
transition to a steady state  
 Structural Change channel - decentralization allows designing regional 
economic policies to the necessities of a regional economy, and thus increases 
growth in case of accompanying by sub-federal experimentation,  
 Political Innovation channel - political innovation serves as another 
growth enhancing mechanism. But it is noteworthy to mention that a high degree of 
political instead of fiscal autonomy of sub-federal units seems to impede economic 
growth, as indicated by the consistently negative sign of the federation dummy. 
 Market-Preservation channel –decentralization, in fact, contributes to 
solve political economy problems 
Fiscal decentralization is a multifaceted process and the nature of relationship 
between growth and subnational taxation or subnational expenditures is very 
complicated. Within the fiscal sphere, all the fiscal decentralization indicators 
using in both theoretical and empirical studies are intertwined and it means that if 
one of these elements is poorly designed or miscalculated, the real relation between 
growth and decentralization is become irrelevant. The design of each pillar of the 
intergovernmental system must be very well linked to broader decentralization 
reform goals and intergovernmental fiscal policy objectives. It is rather the 
efficiency (or inefficiency) properties of fiscal competition, fiscal equalization 
systems, or intergovernmental fiscal relations in a polity in general that determine 
the relation between fiscal federalism and economic performance. (Rodríguez-
Pose, Krøijer, 2009) 
Overall and most importantly, based on the empirical studies it becomes obvious 
that a relationship between decentralization and growth is rather to be expected in 
developed, industrialized countries lending support to the suspicion that fiscal 
decentralization is having much different effects in less developed than in 
developed countries. In addition, single country studies tend to indicate a positive 
effect of decentralization on growth which may be the result of their possibility to 
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consider the specific differences within a country more strongly. Especially various 
econometric models used in empirical researches can give drastically diverse 
results based on the structure of the economy of country. Finally, while it remains 
undecided how a switch from expenditure centralization measures to tax autonomy 
indicators affects the results in favor of fiscal decentralization or not, attempts in 
this issues should be designed taking into consideration features of national 
economic system of each country and empirical studies ought to be implemented 
based on much more appropriate econometric models for targeting countries. 
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Summary 
 
Fiscal decentralization and economic growth:  
A dilemma between theory and empiricism 
 
Azar Hasanli 
Azerbaijan State University of Economics 
 
Abandoning fiscal decision-making, redistributing and dispersing authorities provided by 
central government in favor of local and regional-level governance bodies is one of the 
widely discussed issues across the world based on the theory of “fiscal decentralization”. 
Incumbent theoretical and empiric researches regarding to achieving economic growth in 
the light of global economic fragilities indicate that managerial allocation of public funds 
among central and local authorities casts significant attention in terms of optimizing 
economic efficiency. In the article, it is tried to introduce brief theoretical background and 
measurement techniques to depict empiric relationship between fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth. In addition to investigating empiric facts, an effort to reveal the impact 
of fiscal decentralization on acquiring economic growth is made. Based on the 
investigations conducted in the framework of the article, it becomes obvious that empirical 
approaches toward the issue can be differed in several aspects: the selection of different 
economies, the time period chosen, the economies’ level of development and the estimation 
methodology. However, there are few empirical studies that analyze the relationship 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth, and unfortunately the evidence on 
this topic is inconclusive.  
Keywords: Fiscal decentralization, Economic growth, Efficiency, Provision of funds, 
Governance. 
 
